Showing posts with label neoliberalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neoliberalism. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 3, 2026

Wednesday, February 4, 2026

From Car Bomb to Drone

A piece I wrote is out now in the February issue of The Brooklyn Rail

It traces the lineage from the car bomb to the drone, and explores how everyday technologies slide into tools of warfare, reshaping cities, infrastructure, and civilian life.

Honored to appear alongside Robert B. Pippin and T.J. Clark, and very grateful to Paul Mattick Jr. for his thoughtful comments.

🔗[Read it here].

Tuesday, October 14, 2025

Residual Revolution

The Quiet Politics of Vineland and One Battle After Another

When Thomas Pynchon published Vineland in 1990, the novel read as a post-Reagan elegy for the long twilight of the ’60s, populated by ex-radicals, countercultural communes, and a society that had learned to domesticate dissent. Thirty-five years later, Paul Thomas Anderson’s One Battle After Another, his loose, fever-bright adaptation of Vineland, feels tuned to our late-digital moment: a vision of political disillusion refracted through cinematic spectacle.

One Battle After Another has been justly praised on many fronts: for its storytelling, plot construction, pacing, and blending of multiple tonal registers (political satire, action thriller, noir comedy), as well as for the profound humanity of the main characters, so vividly rendered that even the worst of them, the cruel and despicable Col. Lockjaw, elicits a fleeting sense of empathy by the end ,which is not the case with the even more vile and obnoxious Christmas adventurers.

The cast, to be sure, delivers career-best performances, breathing life into every nuance. And visually, the film is indeed a feast, filled with arresting vistas and breathtaking sequences  – from the opening border-wall tableau to the final car chase, with the camera arcing and plunging like a surfer chasing a monstrous wave –, all crafted with artistry and bound together by Jonny Greenwoods astonishing score, which functions not merely as accompaniment but as an interpretive force in its own right.

And yet, critical reservations have emerged, particularly regarding the film’s depiction of revolution and political action, and the ambiguity of its moral centre; reservations that open a window onto its dialogue with Vineland.

Pynchon’s novel is a sustained meditation on lost revolutionary potential and how remnants of that energy might still be tapped at a time of political exhaustion. Set in 1984, it continually flashes back to the ’60s counterculture, where spectral figures  (the Thanatoids )are haunted by the defeats of that eras radical movements. By contrast, One Battle After Another has been criticized, particularly from a leftist perspective, for transforming political longing into spectacle, turning resistance into mere display. In this view, revolutionary desire becomes kink or stylistic flourish rather than collective orientation, obscuring the subtler, enduring political currents that Pynchon cultivates.

Such a binary  the power of memory versus the seduction of spectacle   misses the deeper continuity between the works. Vineland reflects a moment of disillusionment. Pynchon looks back at the ’60s through the lens of the Reagan era, defined by corporate dominance, militarization, and the emergence of the culture wars , features that today attain the paroxysm.

Though the Vietnam War was over, the psychic aftermath of both the war and the counterculture’s failure to sustain its radical ideals remained vivid. The novel is thus less an exercise in nostalgia than an inquiry into the collapse of a particular vision of freedom and revolution, exploring the gulf opened between promise and reality.

Pynchon portrays a generation suspended between the remnants of non-conformism and the entrenched conservative order that replaced it, a moment when resistance was simultaneously fragmented, repressed, and co-opted, caught in the constant tension between the desire for transformation and the crushing weight of power structures.

The connection between the two periods is tenuous but not entirely lost. Prairie Wheeler, the fourteen-year-old daughter of former radicals, embodies this fragile continuity. She may not inherit her mother Frenesi Gates’s revolutionary fervor, yet she still inhabits a world shaped by that earlier struggle.

Beneath its comic surface, Vineland exposes the legacy of COINTELPRO-style repression and the ways in which the state systematically dismantled and absorbed anti-establishment dissent. Though that utopian charge has waned, Pynchon suggests that traces persist, in memory, in scattered acts of resistance, and in the absurd resilience of figures like Zoyd Wheeler.

In Vineland, the middle names of Prairie’s parents  Frenesi Margaret Gates and Zoyd Herbert Wheeler  function as covert historical signifiers that condense the ideological shift from the radical 60s to the neoliberal 80s. Margaret invokes Thatcher and the consolidation of market hegemony, while Herbert alludes to Marcuse, emblem of the countercultural Left. Frenesi personifies seduction and betrayal: a onetime radical turned state collaborator, moving from underground film collectives to work for the Nixonian political pornography machine. Zoyd, by contrast, now hapless, aging, and stuck in ritualized rebellion, represents a ghostly trace of that earlier intellectual ferment, now faded into nostalgia and farce. 

Their unlikely union, producing Prairie, allegorizes the fusion of these antagonistic legacies: the utopian impulse of the ’60s  the radical vision of a civilization of Eros  absorbed and neutralized within the hyper-commodified, post-ideological landscape of the Reagan era. Through this pairing, Pynchon dramatizes the passage from the utopian and collectivist aspirations of the New Left to the besieged and managed subjectivity of late imperial America.

That’s where the deviations and overlapping between Pynchon’s novel and Anderson’s film come into play. As critic Rory Doherty notes in his review for Time magazine: 

“Apart from their contrasting structural approaches and character backstories, the biggest difference between text and film is setting. Vineland is overflowing with period detail, often ludicrous and sometimes satirically invented, rooted in the history of radicals being expunged by the Nixonian establishment, leading to the inevitable, reductive confines of Reagan’s ‘War on Drugs’ project. But the immediacy of One Battle After Another  with its ICE-like detention camps, unlawful militias storming American streets, and elites who promote white supremacy in closed-door meetings  was intended to embellish the spirit of Vineland rather than undermine it.”

Both novel and film imagine the wreckage of American radicalism, but they do so through different narrative devices and angles. In Pynchon’s novel, the People’s Republic of Rock and Roll (PR³) and the film collective 24fps form a paired allegory for the counterculture’s collapse into image and surveillance. In One Battle After Another, the militant faction French 75 re-stages that collapse in a more literal, violent key, turning the mediated irony of Pynchon’s world into a cinematic drama of insurgency and defeat. Taken together, they trace the passage from revolution as festival to revolution as ghost story.

In Vineland, PR³ is born from the irreverent utopian impulse of the ’60s: a college enclave that proclaims itself a sovereign micro-nation of peace, music, and weed. Pynchon renders it with the tone of a deadpan fable: the moment when political desire turns theatrical. Yet its very theatricality bears the imprint of its undoing. The members of the commune are already performing their freedom for the camera, which belongs to 24fps, the film collective that both documents and aestheticizes dissent. When Frenesi, 24fps’s camerawoman, begins filming for the authorities, the line between art and surveillance blurs. The revolution’s dream of visibility curdles into exposure. 

Allegorically, PR³ and 24fps represent the two faces of late-’60s radicalism: the yearning for liberated community and the fatal belief that liberation could be seen,that image was truth. Pynchon suggests that the countercultures tragedy lay not in repression alone but in its transformation into spectacle, its incorporation into the media economy it meant to overthrow.

One Battle After Another retools this parable into a more direct historical allegory. Its insurgent cell, French 75, condenses the real-world Weather Underground and similar militant groups that turned from protest to armed struggle. Where PR³ parodies the carnival republic, French 75 enacts the firing squad’s logic, yielding to the twin temptations of moral witness and elite voluntarism: the despairing revolt of a dissident petty-bourgeois group without a popular base.

The film compresses Pynchon’s layered temporality into a streamlined narrative of rise and ruin: bombings, betrayals, the erosion of ideals. Allegorically, French 75 stands for the afterimages of the ’60s, the moment when the spectacle of revolution sought to shatter itself through violence, only to become another genre of entertainment. The movie’s sleek cinematography and rhythmic editing make its very depiction of militancy complicit in the spectacle it critiques, accentuating that in both media ecologies, there is no exit from mediation.

Thus, PR³/24fps and French 75 form a dialectic. If Pynchon’s countercultural rebels are undone by representation, Anderson’s radicals implode in the immediacy of outrage. One is undone by the camera, the other by the gun. Between them unfolds the allegory of American idealism’s decay: the slow drift from communal euphoria to paranoia, from visibility to its weaponization.

By transforming PR³’s stoned republic into French 75’s guerrilla network, One Battle After Another trades Pynchon’s postmodern melancholy for tragic immediacy, yet both works end in the same space: the Reaganite (or Trumpist, it makes no difference) wasteland where rebellion survives only as image, an image that, in Anderson’s hands, intensifies rather than resolves that condition.

In that sense, PR³, 24fps, and French 75 are not different factions but sequential masks of the same fallen dream. Each names a stage in the long allegory of resistance: first the commune, then the camera, then the cell, each crushed, recorded, and replayed, until nostalgia is all that remains.

Yet there is another side to this story. Despite their differing emphases, both book and film are less concerned with simply recalling the past than with imagining how resistance, drawing on past experience, might persist in the present.

In Vineland, Pynchon’s focus on family (Prairie, Zoyd, Frenesi) and on the fragile solidarity of those left behind after the collapse of the counterculture points to the endurance of resistance through everyday care, loyalty, and kinship. If One Battle After Another carries this impulse forward, then what might appear to some viewers as spectacularization becomes instead a cinematic retranslation of that same political energy: a vision of how small solidarities, improvised alliances, and acts of attention persist within the hypermediated landscape of late neoliberalism. The parallel with Vineland might, in this sense, shed further light on this transformation.

Pynchon’s novel moves in the dreamlike, mnemonic, and fragmentary logic that defines his work: memory, transgression, failure, and the not-yet matter as much as the ostensible plot. Dreams and fantasies in Pynchon often operate as latent sites of political desire.

In Vineland, Prairie, the teenage girl yearning to reunite with her mother, stands in for the desire to maintain continuity with a radical past, a past foreclosed amid Reagan’s re-election campaign and by the then already omnipresent Tube (television), yet enduring virtually. Prairie inherits history and its defeats, though not in the same way as her parent’s generation. The crushed utopian energies of the ’60s persist, lingering in the present and waiting for another historical opening.

Watching archival footage of an earlier protest, she feels a belated surge of its lost intensity: 

“Even through the crude old color and distorted sound, Prairie could feel the liberation in the place that night, the faith that anything was possible, that nothing could stand in the way of such joyous certainty. She’d never seen anything like it before.” (Vineland, London: Minerva, 1990, p. 210)

Unlike in other Pynchon novels, where stronger revolutionary dynamics offer some measure of redemption  think the rocket counterforce in Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) or the anarchists of Against the Day (2006)  Vineland presents a kind of smaller-scale survival. This has little to do with the survivalism of contemporary ideology; it concerns instead the endurance of a daughter, a broken family, a deferred dream. The novel’s ironic, “sitcom-like” closure signals the collapse of grand revolutionary energies, yet it also preserves the conditions for residual hope, as a not-yet-conscious desire.

Domesticity, seemingly apolitical, acquires a quiet political charge: everyday intimacy  family, storytelling, solidarity  carries its own utopian weight, a quiet refusal to surrender to surveillance and state power.

Back to Anderson’s film, reading it solely as a spectacle-driven flattening of utopian potential misses its attention to alternative forms of resistance: the ways family (however dysfunctional), lasting friendship, and the solidarity of margin-walkers operate as loci of present-day political possibility, echoing Vineland’s intimate counterforces.

In both works, “family” does not mean private retreat but a resistant social microstructure. In Vineland, Prairie’s search for her mother and the reconstitution of family becomes an allegory for rebuilding social memory and solidarity among the dispossessed. In One Battle After Another, family or communal ties among marginal figures resist incorporation into spectacle.

The margins, here, are not merely social but ontological , spaces of possibility where people can still act outside pre-scripted media narratives. This is Pynchons counterforce transposed into the visual register: not heroic revolution but distributed, everyday persistence.

Consider, for instance, Sensei Sergio’s  (Willas Latino karate teacherquiet kindness, resourcefulness, and composure, each put to work within the underground network protecting undocumented immigrants from fascist violence. Also, in the same sequence of this whole alternative organization of urban daily life  one of the films highpoints , the row-on-skateboard shot: youth in motion becomes a visual motif for marginality and improvisation, recalling the latent, restless energies of Pynchons world.

Skateboarding and urban or suburban youth culture resurge here as a figurative synthesis of life pulsating through camaraderie, rebellion, freedom, and the survival of alternative social spaces within rigidly structured, often oppressive environments. Like Prairie’s navigation of domestic and marginal spaces in Vineland, these fleeting moments of youthful mobility suggest the ongoing possibility of living otherwise, of asserting autonomy and solidarity under conditions that would otherwise constrain and surveil. In such gestures, Anderson’s new film finds its quiet politics: not the spectacle of sacrifice, but the slow labour of care. Not, therefore, a revolution televised, but one quietly sustained, in movement, memory, and ongoing attention.

Still, as Richard Brody recently noted in The New Yorker, whereas films such as Godard’s La Chinoise (1967) and Antonioni’s Zabriskie Point (1970) sustained a documentary rapport with real activists and with the immediate experience of the political action they depict, One Battle After Another privileges instead the register of affective labor, resulting, according to the critic, in a film that is at once “brilliant and hollow”, “a vision of hopeful possibilities” yet “unmoored from realities”.

What may appear as vacuity, however, is less a failure of the film than the index of an objective impasse. The absence of direct “revolutionary labor” reflects the very logic of late neoliberalism, in which collective action, in the context of displaced industrialization and hyperproductivity, has been utterly fragmented, depleted, and aestheticized.

Ultimately, both Vineland and One Battle After Another converge in the imagination of a politics of the remainder, a politics of what persists when the grand narratives of emancipation seem exhausted. Pynchon had already intuited, amid the conservative backlash of the ’80s, that resistance would survive less as armed insurgency than as residual energy, dispersed through everyday gestures of care, memory, and solidarity. Anderson, in turn, translates this intuition into the visual regime of the twenty-first century, in which total mediation and spectacle have replaced direct experience. His wager is that pockets of meaning and community can still be cultivated within this regime: autonomous zones of affect and attention, where politics is relearned as a patient and shared practice.

Far from standing in opposition to collective organization, these zones may in fact be more closely in tune with forms of control of economic power devised by and for the working class, rooted in networks of material solidarity, mutual care, and the democratic reappropriation of urban space, and the available resources and means of production and survival.

What the film inherits from Vineland is not merely disillusionment, but the persistence of the possible in a time when we seem unable to see even a hand’s breadth ahead: a minimal utopia, that insists on germinating beneath the ruins of the spectacle.

[A previous version of this piece appeared in Portuguese on A Terra é Redonda]

Tuesday, February 25, 2025

Lessons from Germany

Why Today’s Left Is Losing the Working Class


In the January 2025 French print edition of Le Monde Diplomatique, two articles appear back-to-back in what seems like an unintentional but revealing montage. The first, by Jens Malling, revisits Eisenhüttenstadt, a town built in the 1950s, once envisioned as a socialist model city, designed to integrate labor, culture, and daily life into an egalitarian framework. It traces the steady erosion of rich, diverse public spaces, mapping the transformation of urban landscapes once anchored by libraries, community centers, and non-commercial gathering places, now gutted by privatization, surveillance, and the reduction of civic life to consumerist routine. The second, by Boris Grésillon, chronicles the dramatic rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) among young men in East Germany – particularly in small towns and cities where public institutions that once structured collective life have withered away. Offering a parallel but sharper political portrait, it examines the rising disaffection of young white blue-collar men, increasingly isolated, resentful, and drawn toward right-wing populism.

Side by side, these accounts trace a grim historical arc: from the GDR’s attempt to build integrated, meaningful public spaces to a present where their absence leaves a vacuum the far-right has been all too ready to fill. This apparently unintended juxtaposition reveals something deeper: strip away high-quality communal spaces – youth centers, cultural halls, political forums – and what’s left is an unstructured drift, a social free-fall. And in that free-fall, in an era where social media dictates the terms of belonging, reactionary forces don’t just set up shop – they roll in with a full-fledged theme park, prepared to accommodate. As Grésillon notes, the AfD’s youth wing (Junge Alternative) doesn’t just hand out pamphlets on the glory of the Vaterland; they throw concerts, lead motorcycle outings, and cultivate a meticulously curated digital presence. This proactive engagement in shaping identity and belonging reflects a broader social shift that followed the collapse of the GDR’s socialist project, which created not only economic voids but also cultural and psychological ones – gaps the political establishment of the past three decades has failed to address. And as establishment parties struggle to retain trust, the AfD continues to exploit the resulting sense of betrayal and alienation. 

As Perry Anderson outlined more than a decade ago (in ‘A New Germany?’), the country’s post-reunification trajectory has been shaped by an economic model that has fostered both prosperity and social fragmentation, particularly in the former East:
‘For unification decisively weakened labour. When West German trade unions attempted to extend their organizations to the East, and uphold nation-wide wage rates comparable to those in the West, they encountered industries that were crumbling so fast, and workers so beaten by surrounding unemployment, that failure was more or less foreordained.’
Cheaper labor in Eastern Europe and the outsourcing of industrial plants to Third World countries drastically weakened German trade unions, both in membership and in their ability to resist pressure from capital. In every respect, Germany’s shift toward neoliberalism dismantled the structures that once provided stability and a sense of collective purpose for working-class communities. 

The stark contrast between Eisenhüttenstadt’s egalitarian urbanism and today’s disaffected East German towns underscores the material conditions necessary for a culturally rich and socially meaningful life. A similar dynamic could be observed in the late Soviet era. Sociological studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s in Roubtsovsk and among the rural population of Novosibirsk reveal that, despite the Soviet system’s evident decline – and partly due to the underground economy operating in the shadow of the bureaucratic state – living standards improved during this period. Housing conditions and access to durable goods rose significantly, education levels increased, leisure opportunities expanded, and a third of the population had access to communal gardens, improvements that particularly benefited the less privileged. 

Not everything was rosy – far from it. Yet, as Moshe Lewin showcased in The Soviet Century, cultural participation in former Soviet states declined sharply in the 1990s: fewer people attended theaters, circuses, concerts, and libraries, or engaged with literature and newspapers. Leisure, once culturally enriching, increasingly shifted toward passive, restorative activities, mirroring trends in the West, where the heavier workloads brought on by unrestrained capitalism left little time or energy for intellectual and artistic pursuits. Overall, while the expansion of liberal freedoms and services benefited the highly skilled and entrepreneurial, the majority saw its access to cultural life drastically curtailed. Long before the advent of the internet, social networks, and smartphones, television – coupled with its declining quality – was already exerting a particularly damaging effect on children, who spent hours alone in front of screens. Unlike in the West, this was not yet the case in the USSR during the 1980s. 

Across the former Eastern Bloc and beyond, public space has withered under neoliberal capitalism – another casualty in its long con, leaving a void where collective life once thrived. In the face of this decay, rather than tending to the ruins, much of the contemporary Left – armed with postmodern jargon and the righteous fervor of a Twitter mob – has doubled down on a ghostly crusade of its own. In this theater, whiteness has become a metaphysical stain, masculinity a form of radioactive fallout, and working-class culture the ever-present suspect in an ideological witch trial. In the cleansed, gentrified neighborhoods of major Western cities today, where dive bars have become gluten-free bakeries, laundromats have been reborn as kombucha co-ops, and contact with working-class people, the poor, and the homeless has dwindled to a vanishing point – except when their service is needed to sustain a lifestyle reserved for a privileged few – the new urban clergy – performatively tolerant, polygender-friendly, vegan militant, holistic wellness-obsessed, and thoroughly convinced of their own revolutionary zeal – proselytize in the language of ‘epistemic disobedience’, ‘cultural appropriation’, ‘cis-heteronormativity’, and ‘white privilege’ – terms that, rather than serving as tools of material critique, often function as ritualistic incantations, summoning guilt, expiation, and the dull glow of self-congratulatory despair. 

Of course, not all cultural progressives fit this caricature – many remain steadfast allies in the struggle against the forces of capital. But the Left’s fixation on identity politics – where gender and race emancipation are framed not as fundamental human rights but as an alternative, or even an opposition, to the focus on economic justice – has only deepened alienation and hardened resentment, leaving a void where working-class solidarity should be. And into that void, the far-right, lurking at the fringes, eagerly steps in, offering what much of the Left has abandoned: recognition, belonging, purpose. That it comes wrapped in tinfoil conspiracies and the gaudy nostalgia of reactionary politics makes it no less seductive. 

Rebuilding a Left capable of taking on the far-right requires ditching the sermonizing, the neoliberal guilt-tripping, the endless TED Talk on why the working class and class struggle are relics of a museum exhibit, rather than the engine of meaningful change. Instead of lecturing young white men on their insufficiently deconstructed (or ‘decolonized’) identities, the Left must be able to offer new platforms for envisioning universal emancipation, where solidarity is built not on moral chastisement, but on shared material struggle. 

At first glance, Sahra Wagenknecht’s new party in Germany appears to be a step forward, positioning itself as a bulwark against the rise of the AfD. BSW’s call for economic interventionism, a robust welfare state funded by the wealthy, and a break from corporate dominance marks a genuine – if incomplete – effort to reorient politics toward material concerns. Her critique of today’s culturalist Left is not without merit – she rightly condemns its retreat from class politics into a narrow, moralizing focus on ‘Left-lifestyle’ issues, where diet and pronouns take precedence over poverty and inequality, and where structural injustice is framed as a matter of individual guilt rather than systemic transformation. 

And yet, in seeking to reclaim the working class from the far-right, BSW mirrors some of the very tendencies it seeks to counter. Its hostility to immigration, cloaked in appeals of social solidarity, betrays the very universalism it claims to uphold. The idea that welfare must be confined within rigid national or cultural boundaries cedes ground to reactionary narratives, scapegoating migrants rather than confronting capital itself. Likewise, its rejection of gender inclusivity and embrace of ‘traditional family values’ signal an uneasy alliance with conservative forces that see cultural progressivism not as a misguided emphasis, but as an existential threat. 

A conservative Left is a contradiction in terms. A genuine Left movement must look beyond national borders, to the fight against global inequality, the revival of internationalism, and the reaffirmation of solidarity, forged in struggle both locally and globally with all those dispossessed by capital, neo-imperialism, and ecological collapse. This begins, above all, with standing alongside the displaced, the migrants drowned at sea, torn apart by landmines, gunned down by vigilantes, asphyxiated in cargo containers, locked in detention centers, hunted by neo-Nazi gangs, and condemned to misery in the heart of wealthy nations. To turn away from their suffering is not just politically bankrupt, it is morally indefensible. 

But solidarity cannot stop at bearing witness to suffering, it must translate into material change. The conditions that force millions into displacement are not accidents of fate; they are the direct result of an economic order designed to extract, exploit, and discard. Addressing these crises requires more than moral outrage, it demands a radical rethinking of economic power itself. 

In a 2021 interview, the late Mike Davis was spot on about what needed to be done to counter today’s political ecosystems of fear:
‘The Left puts far too much emphasis on raising taxes and far too little on economic power. Who makes the decisions in the economy and who controls the economy? We need to talk more about public ownership of certain parts of the economy. Social media and Amazon are among the essential infrastructure of a society today. Socialists and middle-class progressives argued at the beginning of the 20th century to put telephone, water and electricity companies in public hands. Regulation is one thing, but nationalizing is better in some cases. During the financial crisis, many people realized that we had nationalized the banks outright. Then we quickly sold them again. Why didn’t we keep them?’
He had been touching on the same key at least since Occupy Wall Street: ‘The great issue,’ he wrote in ‘No More Bubble Gum’, ‘is not raising taxes on the rich or achieving a better regulation of banks. It’s economic democracy: the right of ordinary people to make macro-decisions about social investment, interest rates, capital flows, job creation, and global warming. If the debate isn’t about economic power, it’s irrelevant.’ 

For a clearer path forward, we should follow Davis’s lead in Old Gods, New Enigmas and turn to labor history – not as nostalgia, but as a blueprint for a new proletarian counterculture, one that resists bureaucratic inertia and transcends the narrow confines of economic calculus. This vision hinges on insurgent, innovative technologies and the radical democratization of urban life, anchored in a profusion of alternative institutions: public housing reclaimed from speculation, communal spaces for organizing, education, and militant action; labor colleges, consumer cooperatives, hiking clubs, even free psychoanalytic clinics – sites where class solidarity is built and autonomy forged. 

A radical structural analysis of contemporary society gains real social force and momentum only when it is grounded in a transformative lived experience. Reclaiming public space doesn’t mean repackaging it as yet another gentrified marketplace, where once-thriving streets are sterilized as hipster food courts hawking overpriced craft IPAs. It means restoring the commons as a living, breathing foundation for anti-authoritarian culture, where politics is not a performance but a daily practice. And it means embracing history, not as a cautionary tale, but as a roadmap forward. 

By addressing radical working class needs amid perpetual economic crisis and environmental breakdown – rejecting the false choice between making it to the end of the month and confronting the end of the world – this proletarian public sphere, as Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge would call it, would serve as both the strongest bulwark against the rising tide of neofascism and a transformative blueprint for a new social life. A viable future depends on workers reclaiming control – over the economy, over public life, over the very terms of political struggle. Only through cross-border class solidarity and a revived oppositional public sphere can we break free from managed decline and build a world that bridges the everyday with the utopian, where collective emancipation is not just an aspiration but a lived reality.